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Abstract
I show that when consumers (mis)perceive prices relative to reference prices,
budgets turn out to be soft, prices tend to be lower and the average quality of
goods sold decreases. These observations provide explanations for decentralized
purchase decisions, for people being happy with a purchase even when they have
paid their valuation, and for why trade might a¤ect high quality local rms
unfairly.
1 Introduction
In this paper, I put forward a novel theory of consumer behavior in which people
who have paid their willingness to pay (WTP) for a good or service are ex post
not necessarily indi¤erent between having purchased it or not. This result follows
This is the nal version forthcoming in Quantitative Marketing and Economics, replacing pre-
vious drafts entitled Reference price distortion. I thank Sridhar Moorthy, the Co-Editor, for his
tireless e¤ort to help me improve the manuscript. I am also grateful to Randy Bucklin, Dan Fried-
man, Gianni De Fraja, Botond K½oszegi, Carmen Matutes and Peter Sinclair, as well as audiences
at the ESEM 2007, the 2007 mini-conference on "Behavioural Economics" in Edinburgh and the
Theory seminar in Manchester for useful comments.
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from a new modelling perspective on the well-known phenomenon, that consumers
form an expectation about the rightprice prior to shopping, and this possibly
subjective view inuences the worst acceptable terms of trade for them. The new
insight is that as this WTP is inuenced by factors unrelated to preferences, there
can be a wedge between the price at which the consumer is just willing to trade (that
is, her WTP) and the change of wealth at which she is indi¤erent between owning
the good or not, a value that is strictly preference driven and independent of the
purchasing environment, however broadly construed. Thus, consumers can derive a
non-zero utility, relative to the status quo, even having bought at their WTP. I call
this di¤erence leftover utility. To bring the discussion closer to home, consider the
following scenario:
You have joined the only tness club in the neighborhood where you plan to live
for the rest of your life. The sales executive bargained hard, so the joining fee made
you just about indi¤erent between joining or not. Say, the fee you ended up paying
was
1. higher,
2. lower
than what you had expected. Once you have cooled o¤and could form a precise
opinion about how much you actually like to go to the club: How would you evaluate
your deal on average?
I contend that unless your economics training took the better of you in the rst
case you would be moderately elated (positive leftover utility), while in the second
somewhat disappointed (negative leftover utility). The idea is simple: when you buy
something expensive where expensive is determined in relation to what you expected
to pay beforehand you feel that you are paying too much and as a result (perhaps
subconsciously) hold yourself back. Thus, even if you felt being pushed to the limit
at the time of the transaction, the consumption value of the good will exceed the
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actual price you have paid. And the opposite happens when you purchase something
cheaply, again in relative terms: you feel you are paying too little when you see a low
price, ending up spending too much.
Existing even behavioral economic theory would predict that you would be
indi¤erent between the two situations. In this paper, I develop a simple new model
that captures the above phenomenon, and then derive a number of further testable
predictions from it.
This contribution is intended as a further building block in the research program
started by Richard Thaler (1980) towards a behaviorally based theory of consumer
choice. It is based on the empirically well-established trait of consumer behavior, that
consumers have a prior idea of what a certain item shouldcost, and this reference
price a¤ects their purchasing decision.1 Note that there is no universal procedure for
the generation of this value, rather the process is context and person dependent. Obvi-
ously, past purchase prices, advertisements, hearsay, ethical considerations etc. could
all play a role in the construction of a rational expectation price.In a procedurally
rational framework, the natural reference price is the literal Rational Expectations
Equilibrium (REE) price, where the reference price bias of consumers is common
knowledge, and they can solve for the xed point that makes their expectation of the
price set by producers correct.
The conceptual novelty of my approach is that instead of assuming that the refer-
ence price a¤ects their preferences,2 in my model consumers have standard preferences
but they behave as if the reference price distorted their perception of prices. There
1See Mazumdar et al. (2005) for a review of the substantial empirical literature on reference
prices.
2This has been the approach taken by all the theoretical studies, e.g. Thaler (1985), Putler
(1992), and more recently, Ariely et al. (2004), Heidhues and K½oszegi (2005, 2008) and K½oszegi and
Rabin (2006). Winer (1986) and his followers (see Biswas and Blair, 1991, Bell and Lattin, 2000,
Briesch et al., 1997, Hardie et al., 1993, Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995) sidestep this issue by directly
modelling the dependence of the probability of purchase on the di¤erence between the actual and
the reference price.
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is no presumption that they actually misperceive prices, rather this is just a proxy
for a more complex psychological phenomenon, which nonetheless leads to the same
behavior and has the same welfare consequences.
There is a vast literature about the factors that inuence a consumers perception
of how good a price is (see, e.g. Jacoby and Olson, 1977, Zeithaml, 1988). Niedrich et
al. (2001) present a conceptual framework for the evaluation of price attractiveness
based on the information integration theory of Anderson (1981). They decompose
the mapping from actual prices to a price attractiveness scale into three parts. The
valuation function encodes each observed price as a subjective value, the integration
function forms a single subjective judgement value based on the set of subjective
values, nally the response function maps the judgement value into a price attrac-
tiveness rating. While sharing its spirit, I slightly depart from this framework, as
my mapping is from actual prices to perceived prices, which then consumers use in
standard economic models of rational choice.
The nature of the misperception needed to explain observed behavior is simple:
any price that is above the reference price seems even higher, and any price below the
reference price seems even lower than it actually is. It is as if consumers were wearing
glasses, where the concavity/convexity of the lenses was determined by whether the
reference price is higher or lower than the price currently observed. As a further
distinction from the literature, I do not require that consumers be loss averse (though
I allow for it), not even in the limited sense of price distortions being higher upwards
than downwards from the reference price.
The modelling of reference-price bias in the price rather than the utility di-
mension seems to be the natural approach, after all, the reference price itself is a
price. An immediate consequence of this shift in the location of the distortion is that
the welfare e¤ects of reference-price bias become easier to deal with. The standard
approach modies the decision makers preferences in order to accommodate the bias.
An unintended (but unavoidable) consequence of this is that the welfare measures get
distorted. If instead we leave the preferences intact and account for the bias via a
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perception error, our welfare calculations will be unbiased.3 This is the very reason
why the model can explain the existence of leftover utility, which is subsumed in the
welfare distortion in the standard approach.
Putting welfare considerations to the side, the new framework is shown to be
more general than even the natural extension to divisible commodities of Thalers
(1985) transaction utility model, originally formulated for single-unit purchases. In
particular, it can capture situations where the distortion fades when the distance
between the price and the reference price is large. I discuss the comparison between
the two approaches in detail in Section 5.
I derive a number of specic predictions for consumer and rm behavior. In the
context of consumer demand, I rst show that, depending on the relative position
of the actual price to the reference price, one can be willing to spend more or less
than ones intrinsic valuation of a good, just as in the club joining example above.4
Second, for divisible goods, I show that the amount spent on a good will vary in a
somewhat counter-intuitive way: when the price is below (above) the reference price
the consumer spends more (less) than when she correctly predicts the price. Note
that this is in the absence of a stockpiling motive. When I incorporate the previous
nding into a multi-good scenario, I nd that the insight of the more the cheese
costs the less you can spend on winedoes no longer apply: if the price of a good
is unexpectedly high, you are likely to spend more on complementary goods, unlike
3An intermediate approach, allowing for extra utility derived from purchasing at a certain relative
price say, getting a kickout of buying something cheap is perhaps the ultimate solution.
4The same formulation can be used to model seller behavior. For example, by assuming that a
seller has as reference price the price for which she had bought an item, we can explain why sellers
hold out for unreasonablyhigh prices in an economic downturn, when they are likely to realize a
(nominal) loss relative to the purchase price. Genesove and Mayer (2001) claim that their empirical
results on this phenomenon validate the loss aversion hypothesis. However, they are only looking at
losses, not at gains. Therefore, what they really show is not that losses have larger e¤ects on utility
than gains, but that losses have an amplied e¤ect relative to the standard theory. But that means
that their ndings support my theory just as well.
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what the received theory predicts.5
Next, I turn to the standard consumer choice problem of choosing the optimal
consumption bundle given a budget constraint. In this context, my formulation leads
to notional/soft budgets,6 as these are met not for the true prices, rather the perceived
ones. This is feasible as long as the consumer is only faced with her hard budget
constraint periodically, not at every purchasing decision. I present a simple model of
sequentially distributed consumer choice to support this behavior.
In the context of a market for a single homogeneous good, where the reference price
is given by the REE price, I show that equilibrium prices in Cournot markets would
tend to be lower than in the neoclassical model, for any market structure (including
monopoly) except perfect competition. This result also generalizes to horizontally
di¤erentiated goods, since it is driven by the increase in the price elasticity of demand
as a result of the price distortion. The aggregate welfare e¤ect is positive, with the
consumers beneting by more than what the producers lose.
When there is vertical di¤erentiation, I show that the loss of prot of a high
quality incumbent due to the entry of a low quality competitor is increased as a
result of reference price dependence. This nding provides a partial explanation of
why local high quality rms may be driven out of the market by cheap low quality
5Janakiraman et al. (2006) provide an experimental design that is partially suited to test my
models predictions. In their main study the subjects are asked to minimize the aggregate cost of
stocking a dozen di¤erent goods over 35 periods. Their inventory of any good cannot exceed 4.
They can go shopping in each period at a xed cost, but they must shop in case they stock out
of something (stocks are depleted randomly from the point of view of the subjects). Upon such
mandatoryshopping trips the price of the stocked-out item is raised or lowered by 80%. They nd
that there is a negative spill-over e¤ect: if prices are high (low) in a category the consumer spends
more (less) on the other categories. This squares with my prediction.
6Deaton (1977) has nearly discovered soft budget constraints in a model where there is ination
but the consumers only observe the price increase of a single good at a time. If they (wrongly)
believe that the prices of the other goods have stayed constant, they will spend less than optimal
(and less than mentally budgeted) on the good at question. He then goes on to look at the aggregate
behavior of the economy and does not follow up the consequences on individual behavior.
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imports even when this is not e¢ cient.
2 The reference-distorted price
Based on the evidence cited above, my rst axiom posits the existence of a reference
price, which captures the consumers best guessof how much the item should cost,
before she observes the actual price.
Axiom 1 Consumers have a preconceived idea about the price of each good, which
we call the reference price. Di¤erent consumers or the same consumer in di¤erent
contexts need not attach the same reference price to the same good.
Taking the existence of reference prices as given, the relevant question is: how do
they inuence the consumerspurchasing decisions? One road to go down could be to
assume that the di¤erence between the reference price and the actual price directly
enters the consumersutility function. This is the path that the existing theoretical
approaches have taken (c.f. footnote 2). I make the alternative assumption that the
reference price does not a¤ect the utility derived from purchasing an item. Instead, all
the action takes place via an adjustment in the perception of the actual price, which
then modies consumer behavior exclusively through its e¤ect on expenditure, with-
out a¤ecting preferences. As this approach keeps preferences unchanged, it imposes
strict discipline on the way that reference-price e¤ects can inuence a consumers
decisions and especially her welfare.
The perceived price is generated as a function of the actual and the reference
prices:
Axiom 2 Each consumer is endowed with a price function, P (:; :);R2+ ! R; which
for every reference price, pR; maps from the actual prices, p; into perceived prices,
pP = P (p; pR). Consumers treat the perceived price as a su¢ cient statistic for all
price-related information.
7
A crucial element of my model is the description of the way reference prices distort
the actual prices. My intention is to impose the minimal structure: ideally the
price function should be estimated from observed behavior. Nevertheless, there are
some guiding principles towards the characterization. First, the price function should
capture the empirically established and sensible idea that the subjective e¤ect of a
reference price is to make a price that is higher than it seem (even) higher (a negative
sticker shock); and a price that is lower than it seem (even) lower (a positive sticker
shock). Second, when the actual price coincides with the reference price there should
be no distortion. Finally, one would expect the perceived price to be increasing in
the actual price and decreasing in the reference price. Summing up, I propose the
following:
Axiom 3 The price function has the following properties (for x; y; z  0):
a) P (x; y) > x if y < x;
b) P (x; y) < x if y > x > 0;
c) P (x;x) = x 8x;
d) P (x; y) > P (z; y) if z < x 8y:
e) P (x; z) > P (x; y) if z < y 8x > 0:
Note that while the axiom does not rule out negative perceived prices, it is com-
patible with a setting where P (0; :)  0 and perceived prices are non-negative.
In order to simplify the proofs and to clarify intuition, I make the innocuous as-
sumption that the price function is also di¤erentiable, except possibly at the reference
price. This allows for but does not require7 the equivalent of loss aversion (higher
directional derivative of P (p; y) at p = y from above than from below y) to hold in
7The jury is still out on how general the existence of loss aversion is, especially in the context
of frequently purchased grocery products (c.f. Bell and Lattin, 2000), which is one of this models
prime applications.
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this scenario. Additionally, in order to reconcile the use of real analysis with the
actual discreteness of prices, and in view of the literature on the relevance of the last
digits in retail pricing (c.f. Schindler and Kibarian, 1996), I assume that the slope of
the price function from below is strictly larger than 1 at the reference price Axiom 3
only implies that it is weakly larger than 1. This ensures that the distortion resulting
from a marginal price reduction from the reference price is positive. As we will see
later, this condition is behind the strict increase in price elasticities that drive many
of the results.
Assumption 1 P (x; y) is di¤erentiable in its rst argument, except for a possible
kink at y. Moreover, its left derivative at x = y is strictly larger than 1.
In most of the paper I will only use Axioms 1-3 (and Assumption 1) to derive my
results. However, for illustrational purposes it is useful to have a concrete functional
form in mind. I propose the following:8
P(p; p
R) := p

1 + 
p  pR
pR

: (1)
Here,   0 is a parameter measuring the intensity of price distortion, which may
vary across consumers, and perhaps even for the same consumer across di¤erent
contexts. When  = 0; there is no distortion, P0(p; :)  p; while the size of distortion,P(p; pR)  p ; is increasing in : It is straightforward to check that P(:; :) satises
Axiom 3 and Assumption 1.
8This price function is convex. If that is considered inappropriate, say because we might expect
the reference price e¤ect to decrease for very high prices, a logistic function could be used as an
alternative. Here I opt for simplicity.
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3 The e¤ects of reference distorted price percep-
tion (RDP) on consumer demand
3.1 Single-unit purchases
The simplest formulation of consumer choice is to look at a single binary purchasing
decision like buying or not a durable good in isolation. A consumer is going to
buy if the price does not exceed her willingness to pay (WTP). A consumers WTP
for an object is a basic building block for all trade models, whether disaggregate (say,
bilateral bargaining) or aggregate (say, a competitive market). Hence, the reference
price e¤ect on WTP can have far-reaching consequences. With RDP, the highest
actual price the consumer is willing to pay, denoted by vR, is implicitly dened by
the highest perceived price, pP = P (p; pR), she is willing to pay. Formally
U (w; 0) = U
 
w   P (vR; pR); 1 ; (2)
where w denotes wealth, and the second argument of the (indirect) utility function
U(:; :) is an indicator function, showing whether the consumer owns the item. In
words, the consumer is willing to pay up to the actual price at which the perceived
price would make her indi¤erent between buying and not buying. This denition not
only implies that her WTP is a function of the reference price she had in mind, but it
also captures the exact form of this relationship. Even without specifying the utility
function we can conclude that by Axiom 3e), and consistent with intuition, the WTP
is increasing in the reference price: the more expensive you expect an item to be, the
more you are willing to pay for it.
It is important to observe, that according to (2) the consumer may decide to
purchase the item even when the actual price exceeds her wealth. I will explore the
implications of this soft budget constraintin Section 3.4.
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3.1.1 Leftover utility
Leftover utility is the utility the consumer actually derives net of the utility she
thought she was deriving while under the e¤ect of RDP, evaluated at the actual price
of vR. Hence it is given by
U
 
w   vR; 1  U  w   P (vR; pR); 1 = U  w   vR; 1  U (w; 0) : (3)
As it is clear from (3) an alternative denition is that leftover utility is the con-
sumers share of the gains from trade at the actual price the consumer is willing to
pay, vR.
3.1.2 Valuation vs. willingness to pay
The wealth reduction that would make a consumer indi¤erent between buying or not
is dened as her valuation, which we will denote by v. Its dening equation is then
U (w; 0) = U (w   v; 1) : (4)
As this is a pricelessdenition, a consumers valuation is not a¤ected by RDP
and therefore it coincides with her WTP in the standard model. However, in the
reference-price context as follows from (2) and the fact that utility is increasing in
wealth it is the price perceived by the consumer when she is charged her WTP, rather
than the WTP itself, that equals her valuation: P (vR; pR) = v: This observation has
some clear implications.
Proposition 1 Given Axioms 1-3 the following hold:
i) If her reference price exceeds her valuation for an item, then the consumer is
willing to spend more than her valuation on the item, leading to a negative leftover
utility.
ii) On the other hand, if her reference price is less than her valuation for it, then
she is not willing to pay as much as her valuation for the item, leading to a positive
leftover utility.
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Proof. Given P (vR; pR) = v, from Axiom 3a) and b) it is immediate that pR >
(<)v implies vR > (<)v:
Proposition 1 provides a simple explanation for some important stylized facts
along the lines of the health club scenario mentioned in the Introduction: on the
one hand, in periods of generalized price reductions (sales) people tend to buy things
that they do not really need (that is, they pay for the item more than what it is
worth to them resulting in negative leftover utility) just because it is a good deal
in the sense that the price is lower than the reference price, which in this case can
be identied with the pre-sale price; on the other hand, when people are bidding in
an ascending price auction for an item that they value highly  in the sense that
their valuation exceeds their reference price even if they win it just when they were
about to drop out (and hence they pay their WTP) they are usually happy with
their purchase, indicating that away from the reference-price environment they are
not truly indi¤erent: positive leftover utility.
This latter point underlines the importance of distinguishing what goes on in the
consumers mind at the time of the purchasing decision and once she has cooled o¤.
In Section 5, I will discuss this issue in more detail.
3.1.3 Brand choice
Assume the consumer has a unit demand but has several substitutes available for
purchase. That is, her problem is
argmax
i
U (w   ppi ; i) ;
where the second argument of the (indirect) utility function is the brand she ends up
buying, with no purchase as i = 0; p0 = 0: As we are talking about substitutes, the
reference price should be common to all brands. If the brands are perfect substitutes,
in the sense that U(x; i) = U(x; j) for all x; i; j 6= 0; then RDP will have no e¤ect on
the choice between brands, as it is order preserving: the consumer will always end up
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choosing the cheapest brand both in terms of actual and perceived price as long
as she does purchase.
In general, the e¤ects would depend on the exact specication of the price and
utility functions. What we can say in general is that RDP will make it less/more
likely that something with a price above/below the reference price is chosen.
If the distortion is increasing with the distance from the reference price, then it
would always bias choice towards the cheaper alternatives.
3.2 Multi-unit purchases
The consumers decision becomes more interesting when the choice variable is contin-
uous, rather than binary. According to my formulation, there are no further degrees
of freedom as to how to formalize this and the corresponding optimization problem
is straightforwardly dened as
x = argmax
x0
U
 
w   pPx;x ;
where the second argument of the (indirect) utility function now signies the (real)
number of units bought. In other words, we simply substitute in the perceived price
for the actual price in the standard model. Note that, since it is the unit price that is
distorted, the distortion gets scaled up linearly by the amount bought. Hence ceteris
paribus the (absolute) change in consumption as a result of RDP will be larger for
consumers who really like the product and, therefore, consume a lot of it.
For all sensible utility functions, when the standard model leads to downward
sloping demand, so does this one even though in the conditions for optimum, we
are evaluating the derivatives of these utility functions at di¤erent values in the two
models.
If demand is downward sloping in the perceived price, then we have that a positive
(negative) price surprise, pR   p > (<)0; increases (decreases) the amount bought
relative to the standard model. To see this, just notice that, by Axiom 3d) and e),
the perceived price is decreasing in pR   p:
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As a straightforward consequence holding the actual price constant the total
spend also varies in the same direction. This means that when a good is unusually
cheap, the consumer actually spends more as a result of RDP. Similarly, observing an
unexpectedly high price the consumer decreases the amount bought so that overall
she ends up spending less than in the absence of RDP.
Proposition 2 If demand is decreasing in price, then relative to the standard model
demand and expenditure are always higher (lower) if the actual price is below (above)
the reference price, and vice versa.
In the multi-unit context, the discrepancy between valuation and WTP identied
in Subsection 3.1.2 transmutes into a rotation of the original (inverse) demand
function (which assigns a valuationto each quantity) around the point on it at the
reference price, leading to higher WTP for quantities above the reference quantity
and lower WTP for quantities below it. I will return to the discussion of the distorted
(aggregate) demand function in Section 4, where I analyze the sellersreaction to it.
Implicitly, these results also tell us how the quantity purchased of the other goods
will vary with the RDP of a given good, as in addition to substitution (or comple-
mentarity) e¤ects the money left over for those purchases will change:
3.3 Cross-demand e¤ects
Assume that, for the purpose of this analysis, the groupings of categories into the same
period are exogenously given say, because they are sold in the same shop (or even
in the same aisle). To simplify matters, assume that there is only one good subject to
RDP and the rest can be bundled together as if they were a single commodity the
demand for which we call cross demand. We then have the following result, which
follows from Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 Relative to the standard model
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1. If cross demand is increasing in the reference-distorted price, then cross de-
mand and cross expenditure are higher (lower) if this price is above (below) the
reference price;
2. If cross demand is decreasing in the reference-distorted price, then cross de-
mand and cross expenditure are lower (higher) if this price is above (below) the
reference price.
This result leads to di¤erent predictions from the models that use the utility
function as the vehicle for the reference price e¤ect. I will discuss the di¤erences in
Section 5; now I turn to a more in depth analysis of how RDP a¤ects the budget
constraint.
3.4 RDP and budgets
Let us consider a consumer choosing her preferred bundle of n goods given a budget.
According to my theory, reference prices a¤ect her choice via the prices only and,
therefore, exclusively through the budget constraint. In e¤ect, given her budget, B;
she solves:
argmax
x0
u (x1; x2; :::; xn) s.t.
nX
i=1
pPi xi  B: (5)
A crucial consequence of this formulation is that the budget constraint will be satised
for the perceived, rather than the actual prices. As a result, in general the consumer
will either under- or overspend relative to her budget.
Understandably, this may sound odd at rst. In the absence of a saving motive,
spending less than the budget is sub-optimal, while spending more than it sounds
infeasible. However, it actually makes a lot of sense, if one recalls that the static
model with a budget constraint is just a sub-problem of a dynamic scenario. In
principle, the consumer is faced with optimizing her life-time consumption plan. It is
a simplication to assume that this can be disaggregated into static constrained choice
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problems. My basic assertion is that the amount of money available for consumption
at a given point in time is not xed. The budgets consumers use in their optimization
are only notional, they mainly exist to simplify the complexity of the problem. I
am not assuming that budgets are fully elastic and income can costlessly be moved
across periods. Rather, I claim that budgets are not fully inelastic. For most purchase
decisions of most consumers (in developed countries) there is su¢ cient exibility 
think of a credit card, for example to borrow against future income at a (small)
cost. Similarly, there is no major obstacle to saving, even retaining the real value of
funds, so an underspend does not imply wasted resources.
The heterogeneity of budget elasticities in the population can be neatly captured
by di¤ering intensities of the reference-price e¤ect (). In fact, it may make sense to
treat this parameter asymmetrically around the reference price. The amount spent
by a person with low borrowing potential may not be much a¤ected by unexpectedly
low prices (low ); but be still very sensitive to unexpectedly high prices (high ):
Note that this would be very similar to the e¤ect of loss aversion.
We can go even a step further: it need not be the case that the consumer is faced
with the problem of reconciling her expenditure with her budget constraint every time
she makes a purchase.9 Solving problems like (5) are quite di¢ cult for the average
consumer, especially when they have lots of items to buy think of a weekly grocery
shopping, for example. The natural way boundedly rational consumers simplify their
optimization problem is to have notional budgets also for subsets (categories) of the
goods they are buying.10 So much for fruit, for milk products, for wine etc. Then they
can separately optimize in each subset, but in the absence of hard budget constraints.
The next subsection formalizes this idea.
9See Soman (2001) for a discussion (and test) of how spending behavior varies with the payment
mechanism, where the main distinctions are the rehearsaland immediacy of payments.
10See Heath and Soll (1996) and Thaler (1999), for a discussion of theory and evidence on the
mental budgeting process.
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3.5 A simple model of consumer behavior
Let the planning horizon of our consumer be T periods. She has some disposable
income, M , for the planning horizon, to spend on planned purchases. There are K
 T categories of goods that she buys. We denote by xk the amount (or quality11) she
purchases of each category. Based on her experience and the available information,
she forms an expectation of the price for each category, pEk : She can then calculate
the optimal bundle to buy during the planning horizon using these expected prices
(that is, her reference prices). This will result in notional budgets for each period.
From the consumers point of view, actual prices are random and she only nds
them out when she observes them, period by period. As the actual price may di¤er
from the expected one, the consumer may su¤er a sticker shock. The e¤ect of such
a surprise is a price distortion, which is modelled following Section 2 of this paper. As
argued above, this may lead to an outlay which is either above or below the notional
budget.
Crucially, however, the imbalance need not a¤ect consumer behavior in the sub-
sequent decisions (within the same planning horizon). Note that the consumer does
feelthat she has just spent her notional budget, even if this is not the case. Con-
sequently, until she counts her moneyand re-optimizes12 which I assume she is
doing every T periods  the amount actually spent in a period will not inuence
her behavior in the other T   1 periods. The length of the planning horizon, T; is
thus an important parameter. With suitably chosen planning horizons which could
correspond to the frequency with which she receives income the consumer can sim-
ply take stock and redo her lifetime optimization based on her realized wealth (and
updated reference prices) at that moment.
11In order to interpret xk as the quality rather than quantity of a product, we might need to
consider non-linear prices. While this is clearly doable, for simplicity, I stick to linear prices here.
12That the frequency with which consumers (or investors) take stock of their activities can be a
relevant parameter was rst shown in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), where they explain the equity
premium puzzle by using loss aversion and yearly evaluation of stock returns.
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An interesting question is how a consumer who knew that she su¤ered from
reference-price bias, would try to mitigate its e¤ects.13 As at the time of purchase
she cannot help herself, a way to inuence her decision is by setting sub-optimal
notional budgets. Note that decreasing the soft budget assigned to a (joint) pur-
chasing decision unambiguously lowers the amount spent (for every realization of the
actual price). With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the variance of the amount spent also
decreases, as the purchase decisions are separable and the notional budget, Bn, enters
the error term multiplicatively:

1  p
pP

Bn. Thus, under the reasonable assump-
tion that overspending is more costly than underspending, Cobb-Douglas preferences
should lead to conservative notional budget assignments. This is consistent with Pen-
nings et al. (2005) where they nd that budget-constrained consumers tend to spend
less than their budget.
Note, however, that for other types of preferences the result is not obvious, as
in the calculation of the variance of spending the covariances enter the picture. For
example, if there are two goods and the consumer has a very high reference price for
one of them but a very low one for the other the expected value of
 
pP1   p1
  
pP2   p2

will be negative, which might lead to the overall variance being decreasing in the
notional budget.
An alternative way to mitigate the e¤ects of a sudden budget squeeze when an
overspend is detected, is to order the purchases hierarchically across planning hori-
zons, making the favorite purchases rst and leaving the less important ones exposed
to a possible budget readjustment, much in the same way as time is budgeted by
rational individuals.
13This is related to the idea that mental budgeting can be used for self-control purposes, c.f.
Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
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4 The implications of RDP for rms
In this section I show that the aggregate e¤ect of the consumersRDP is to make the
(residual) demand curve more elastic, and consequently it results in lower prices in
monopoly and in imperfect competition (even with di¤erentiated products). While
the derivation of these results is quite straightforward, they serve as good vehicles
towards a better understanding of the mechanics of the distortion and they also lead
to empirically relevant (and perhaps testable) predictions, making their discussion
worth the while. In our main discussion I will assume that the reference price is the
one the consumers rationally expect in equilibrium, given that their RDP is common
knowledge.
4.1 Monopoly
Assume that in the standard context (without RDP), aggregate demand would be
given by the di¤erentiable function, D(p); where D(1) = 0 and  1 < dD(p)
dp
< 0;
for all p 2 (0; 1]: Assume as well that the demand function satises the monotone
hazard-rate property that is, that D(:)=D0(:) is increasing.
Fixing, for simplicity, the cost of production at zero, it is immediate that the
monopoly price, pM , is the unique solution to
D(pM) =  pMD0(pM): (6)
Now, suppose that the monopolist is aware that consumers perceive prices accord-
ing to Axioms 1-3, with a common reference price this will follow endogenously 
and the same price function just for simplicity for all.
Let us denote the newdemand curve by DR(:): Then we have that DR(p) 
D(P (p; pR)): By Axiom 3 c), DR(pR) = D(pR); that is, at the reference price the two
demand curves coincide. In addition, we also have that DR(p) < D(p) for p > pR and
DR(p) > D(p) for p < pR: In other words, D(P (p; pR)) is qualitatively a clockwise
rotation of D(p) around the point (pR; D(pR)):
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What will the new monopoly price be?
We can write total revenue as pD(P (p; pR)); yielding the rst-order condition
D(P (pMR; pR)) =  pMRD0(P (pMR; pR))P1(pMR; pR): (7)
Note that the optimal adjusted monopoly price, pMR , will be a function of the
(common) reference price of the consumers.
If it is common knowledge that the monopolist is aware of the RDP of consumer
demand, then the consumers rationally expect the monopolist to set a price solving
(7). This price will naturally play the role of the reference price in their price function.
To rationalize the consumersexpectation, the reference price must then be equal to
the optimal monopoly price, leading to a xed-point argument.
Proposition 3 The monopoly price under a rationally expected reference price is
lower than the monopoly price in the absence of a reference price: pRE < pM .
Proof. If the price function is di¤erentiable, any RE price is given by a solution14
to (7), with pR = pMR:
D(pRE) =  pRED0(pRE)P1(pRE; pRE): (8)
By Assumption 1, P1(p; p) > 1 for all p: By the monotone hazard-rate property of
the demand function, this implies pRE < pM for all solutions to (8).
When there is a kink at the reference price, we need to look at directional deriv-
atives. Let us denote the operators for left and right derivatives dL=d and dR=d; re-
spectively. Then the (local) incentive constraints that need to be satised at p = pRE
can be rewritten as
D(P (p; pRE))   pD0(P (p; pRE))dLP (p; p
RE)
dp
;
D(P (p; pRE))   pD0(P (p; pRE))dRP (p; p
RE)
dp
: (9)
14The solution exists as  D(:)=D0(:) is continuously decreasing from a positive value to zero, while
pREP1(p
RE ; pRE) is continuous, starts at zero and it is positive ever after. A su¢ cient condition for
uniqueness is that pP1(p; p) is increasing in p.
20
Since dLP (p;p
RE)
dp
> 1; there is a clear incentive to decrease the price from any reference
price weakly above the monopoly price.
The intuition for the result is clear: as the (inverse) demand function is rotated
counter-clockwise, the price elasticity of demand is increased at the original monopoly
price, so unit-elasticity is reached at a lower price.
4.1.1 Heterogeneous price functions
If di¤erent consumers have di¤erent price functions, but the distribution of those
is common knowledge, then generically the same analysis applies. As long as the
monopolist has a unique best response (that is, the distribution of price functions is
well behaved), this will serve as the reference price for all consumers. Given the
common reference price all the consumers will experience a price distortion in the
same direction both above and below the reference price.
4.1.2 Adaptive expectations
Instead of having forward looking rational expectations, we could have our con-
sumers react adaptively to new information. Imagine that they all start out with
di¤erent reference prices, the distribution of which is known to the monopolist. Then
the monopolist will best respond to these, setting her optimal price. Upon observing
this price, the consumers will update their reference prices, replacing it with the cur-
rent price. The monopolist then best responds to this reference price, the consumers
update, and so on. In this manner a process of tbatonnement will ultimately drive the
market to the xed point derived above.15
15We could equally have consumers just move their reference prices towards the current price,
rather than replacing it with it. This would mean that the reference prices only get homogenized in
the limit, but would not change the limit price itself.
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4.2 Oligopoly
In this section we investigate to what extent the price reducing e¤ect observed in the
monopoly context carries over to a market with (imperfect) competition.
4.2.1 Homogeneous goods, price competition
In a Bertrand set-up the RDP is dwarfed by the e¤ect of head-oncompetition. As
the rm undercutting the rest receives the entire market demand, small distortions
in it do not a¤ect behavior. Nonetheless, if the marginal costs are di¤erent, there is
a scenario in which RDP may make a di¤erence. Recall that in asymmetric Bertrand
competition the lowest cost seller serves the entire demand. In equilibrium, she
charges the second lowest cost unless the monopoly price is below that cost. As we
have seen, RDP reduces the optimal monopoly price, and hence it is possible that as
a result of RDP the Bertrand equilibrium price is lowered: from the second lowest
cost to the RDP a¤ected monopoly price.
4.2.2 Homogeneous goods, quantity competition
It is quite intuitive that the e¤ects observed in case of monopoly will also appear when
an oligopolist reacts to a residual demand curve. In order to establish this result, we
rst need to elaborate how the Cournot model works under RDP. The easiest way to
formalize this is by observing that all the changes in consumer behavior are captured
in the newdemand function, DR(p) = D
 
P
 
p; pRE

; where p is the actual price.
Thus, if the total quantity produced is Q =
P
qi; then the actual price is D 1R (Q) and
the perceived one is P
 
D 1R (Q) ; p
RE

: In rational expectations equilibrium, these two
must coincide.
Based on the above observation, we can use the standard analysis, all we need
to do is substitute in the more price elastic demand function. Let us write the total
revenue of producer i as pqi: This leads to the rst-order condition
@p
@qi
qi + p =
@D 1R (
P
qi)
@qi
qi + p = 0:
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Noting that @D
 1
R (
P
qi)
@qi
= 1
D0R(D
 1
R (
P
qi))
= 1
D0R(p)
and that nqi = DR(p); we obtain the
equilibrium condition
DR(p)
D0R (p)
=  np:
Let pC(n) denote the standard Cournot price, dened byD(pC(n)) =  npC(n)D0  pC(n).
When this is the reference price, DR(pC(n)) = D(pC(n)) =  npC(n)D0
 
pC(n)

<
 npC(n)D0R
 
pC(n)

; as the newdemand function is more elastic at the reference
price.16 As a consequence, the resulting Cournot price, pCRE(n);must be lower. Thus,
we have shown that
Proposition 4 The Cournot price under a rationally expected reference price is
strictly lower than the Cournot price in the absence of a reference price: pCRE(n) <
pC(n), and hence the quantity produced is larger. Thus, RDP makes competition more
intense.
Let us turn to the interplay between the amount of competition and RDP next. In
order to be able to look at comparative statics, let us assume that (inverse) demand
is linear, given by p = A Q. Also, let us use the specic functional form proposed
for the price function above, (1). Straightforward calculations show that the resulting
equilibrium price will be given by pCRE(n; ) = A
1+n(1+)
: Thus, as expected, the price
reduction is increasing in the intensity of RDP. While the absolute change resulting
in the equilibrium price is clearly decreasing, the proportional change is actually
increasing in the number of competitors:
d(pCRE(n;)=pCRE(n;0))
dn
=   
(1+n(1+))2
< 0:
Unlike in the Bertrand case, the intensity of Cournot competition does not crowd out
the RDP e¤ect.
4.2.3 Horizontally di¤erentiated products
In a symmetric Hotelling set-up, the reference price will be the common equilibrium
price. For any transportation cost that does not cause technical di¢ culties, the
16When the price function, and thus the demand function, is not di¤erentiable at the reference
price, we can just substitute in the left derivative and the same argument goes through.
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demand functions once again become more own-price elastic with RDP. Thus, for
xed locations, prices will be lower with reference-price e¤ects than in the standard
context.
As a further consequence, the increased price competition will tend to increase
the incentives for di¤erentiation relative to the standard case.
If the rms are not symmetric, the reference price is not so easily identied, as
they are going to charge di¤erent prices. However, based on either range or frequency
theories the literature would lead to a reference price as some weighted average of
the prices charged. In the case of a duopoly, this would mean that the rm setting
the lower price is helped while the other is hurt by RDP. This will clearly decrease
the higher of the two prices, while the e¤ect on the lower price is indeterminate in
general.
In a monopolistically competitive market, again prices will be lower with RDP.
This will alleviate the problem of operating below the e¢ cient scale, but increase the
business stealing e¤ect. As a result, the overall impact on the amount of entry is
dependent on the specic functional forms.
4.2.4 Vertically di¤erentiated products with an incumbent and an entrant
Finally, let us investigate how RDP inuences the competition between an incumbent
monopolist and an entrant producing an inferior substitute. This setup is motivated
by the wide-spread concern that globalization (understood as unrestricted interna-
tional trade) undermines the market viability of locally produced high quality goods
(c.f. Kiyotaki and Moore, 2003).
Assume that the incumbent (Firm 1) and the entrant (Firm 2) are located at
the two endpoints of a two-unit-long Hotelling interval. Consumers are uniformly
distributed between the incumbent and the midpoint of the interval, capturing the
incumbents quality advantage. Travel costs are linear and each consumer values the
good at 2 minus his travel cost. Finally, the constant marginal cost of the incumbent
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is c, while that of the entrant is zero, allowing for a cost advantage to the low quality
producer. In this scenario it is natural that the reference price is given by the price
charged by the incumbent following the entry of the low quality rm, even if prices
are set simultaneously.
Proposition 5 As a result of RDP, the incumbent is forced to reduce its price further,
making it worse o¤ :
Proof. Note that as the reference price is p1; the leaders prices are not distorted:
pP1 = p1:The marginal consumer is given by the x value solving x+ p1 = 2  x+ pP2 ;
leading to x(p1; p2) =
2+pP2  p1
2
: Let us denote @p
P
2 (p

2;p

1)
@pi
by p0i: The prots of Firm 1 are
given by (p1   c)x(p1; p2); leading to the best response function p1(p2) = 2+c+p
P
2  cp01
2 p01 :
Under full market coverage, the entrants problem is to maximize p2 (1  x(p1; p2)) ;
which leads to the (implicit) best response function p2(p1) =
p1 pP2
p02
: Without spec-
ifying the price function we cannot solve for the resulting prices. Nonetheless, we
can deduce some qualitative comparative static results. By Axiom 3d), we know that
p01 < 0 and p
0
2 > 1: As a result, we can show that the incumbents best response func-
tion is lower as a result of RDP. To see this, rst note that @p1(p2)
@p01
= 2  c+ pP2 > 0;
which  together with p01 < 0  directly implies that the incumbents reaction is
more aggressive than in the standard model. In turn, p02 > 1 and p
P
2 < p2 imply
that pP2 (p1) <
p1
2
: Thus, at least as it is perceived by consumers, the entrants price
reaction is also more competitive. The lower perceived price of the entrant shifts the
residual demand downward, ensuring that even following its best response (a price
reduction) the incumbent will be worse o¤.
The intuition is quite clear even without a formal analysis. As the entrant always
sets the lower price in equilibrium, RDP will always have a favorable e¤ect on its
perceived price, increasing its competitive edge. As perceived prices are strategic
complements, the incumbent is forced to lower its price to counteract. Note that it
is indeterminate whether the actual price charged by the entrant will go up or down
as a result of RDP. Thus, while the incumbent loses due to RDP, the e¤ects on the
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entrants prot, the market shares and consumer welfare depend on the specics of
the price function.
An interesting feature of this price setting game is that despite the simultaneity
of o¤ers, as the reference price is set by the incumbent, it has a Stackelberg avor.
Note that even taking the actual price of the entrant as a parameter (as one should
when calculating a best response function), the incumbent alters the perceived price
of the entrants good by varying its own price: when the incumbent lowers its price,
not only will its good become more attractive but the entrants price will look less
good to the consumers, as their reference price has decreased. Due to this double
whammythe overall (Bertrand) equilibrium e¤ect of RDP is a lower price charged
by the incumbent. In the sequential price setting game an additional e¤ect would
come into play: we would have to take the total (rather than just the partial, as
above) derivative of pP2 relative to p1; adding a term which because of strategic
complementarity  is increasing in the incumbents price. As a result the overall
e¤ect would depend on the specic price function.
5 Comparison with the transaction utility approach
Thaler (1985) proposes a decomposition of the change in a consumers utility as a
result of buying an item into two additive components. The rst one is just the
standard change as a result of paying the price and gaining the item the acquisition
utilitywhile the second component is a function of the di¤erence between the price
and the reference price, which he calls transaction utility, t(pR   p). This function
is assumed to be increasing, convex below and concave above zero, with t(0) = 0.
In other words, good surprises give a positive kick, while bad ones result in a
negative utility shock. He also assumes that the negative shocks are larger and thus
the term exhibits loss aversion (t(p  pR) <  t(pR   p) for p > pR):
Formally, in my notation, Thaler denes the consumers WTP as the price which
26
solves
U (w; 0) = U (w   p; 1) + t(pR   p): (10)
Implicitly dening P 0(p; pR) as U
 
w   P 0(p; pR); 1  U (w   p; 1)+ t(pR p); we
can reproduce the Thaler set-up (c.f. (2) and (10)) as long as the resulting P 0(p; pR)
satises Axiom 3. Using the fact that utility is strictly increasing in wealth, this can
be easily veried (see Proposition 6 below) sometimes we would need a negative
perceived price to capture the additional utility incorporated in the transaction utility
term for low actual prices, but that is compatible with Axiom 3. It is also easy to see
that loss aversion would indeed translate to a higher directional derivative below the
reference price than above it. Note, however, that the price-function approach is more
general, as the above process cannot be inverted: in general, the resulting transaction
utility will depend on p in a more complex way than simply on the di¤erence, p  pR,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 1 Let P (p; pR) = pR + (p   pR); with  > 1; and U (x; 1) = ln(x): We
then have that t(p; pR) = U
 
w   P (p; pR); 1  U (w   p; 1) = ln w pR+(p pR)
w p :
This asymmetry is due to the more permissive denition of the price function,
which does not restrict the functional form to depend only on the di¤erence between
the price and the reserve price (c.f. Axiom 3). If we thought that such a restriction had
to be satised, then in general the two approaches would not be compatible. Going the
other way, relaxing the original restrictions on the transaction utility term, outcome
equality between the two approaches could be restored, with some restrictions, as
discussed below.
Even if the choices made following either of the two approaches coincide, the
consumers utility derived from the purchase will be di¤erent. My model implies that
only the acquisition utility matters, while the Thaler approach would take full account
of the transaction utility as well, and consequently could not explain the tness club
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scenario at the beginning of this paper.17 Note that by comparing (3) with (10) we
can, in principle, identify the leftover utility as t(pR   vR) : the transaction utility
gained when the actual price makes the consumer with RDP indi¤erent. This is
only a quantitative identity. The crucial di¤erence is that the transaction utility is
supposed to be something the consumer actually enjoys/su¤ers in addition to the
acquisition utility, while leftover utility is not an actually felt utility, rather it is the
articial construct of the di¤erence between acquisition utility at price p = vR and
the counterfactual option of not having bought. Alternatively, the leftover utility is
the actual change in acquisition utility moving from a reference-price environment
to a reference-free environment, when p = vR  that is, when a RDP consumer
is indi¤erent. By (10), there would be no such change in the transaction utility
framework.
My claim is that the reference-price bias has a larger impact at the point of the
purchasing decision than the transaction utilitys share of total utility. Soon after
the purchase the reference-price e¤ect fades away. Thus, the discounted lifetime
value of the good (the acquisition utility) is likely to dwarf the transaction utility.
However, at the time of trade, the reference-price e¤ect can be very strong. My model
allows for incorporating that strong e¤ect without distorting welfare. Of course, the
best model is probably a combination of the two. It would be straightforward to
include a transaction utility term as well as the price distortion. For now, it seems
more didactic to concentrate on the extreme case where the price function replaces
transaction utility.
When the choice ceases to be binary, it is unclear how Thalers theory should
be generalized. Note that unlike in the present model  it is not predetermined
how the transaction utility should vary with the quantity purchased. If we added a
quantity-independent transaction utility term to the objective function, the chosen
17Even ex post, the consumer would have to admit that she received a utility shock the transaction
utility at the time of purchase, so her evaluation of the deal should not vary with the sign of the
di¤erence between the reference and purchase prices.
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amount would be una¤ected (conditional on a purchase), as the transaction utility (as
dened in Thaler, 1985) only depends on the unit price and not on the total spend. Al-
ternatively, we could dene transaction utility to be a exible construct: t
 
x; p; pR

:
As a natural extension of the original concept we would want the transaction utility
to satisfy the following
Assumption 2 1. t
 
x; pR; pR

= 0;
2. t
 
x; p; pR

> 0 if p < pR;
3. t
 
x; p; pR

< 0 if p > pR;
4.
dt(x;p;pR)
dp
< 0;
5.
djt(x;p;pR)j
dx
> 0;
6.
dt(x;p;pR)
dpR
> 0:
In the sequel, we will also need to refer to the following assumption, which imposes
a lower bound on the slope of the price function.
Assumption 3 The price function satises
dP
 
p; pR

dp
>
U 0
 
w   xP  p; pR ;x
U 0 (w   xp;x) :
We can now state the outcome equivalenceresult formally. Its proof is in the
Appendix.
Proposition 6 For any transaction utility function satisfying Assumption 2, there
exists a price function satisfying Axiom 3 and Assumption 1, such that the consumers
choice is the same. However, only for a price function satisfying Assumption 3 in
addition to Axiom 3 and Assumption 1 there exists a transaction utility function
satisfying Assumption 2, such that the consumers choice is the same.
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The conditions t
 
x; p; pR

needs to satisfy for outcome equivalence with the price
function approach are the ones we would expect.18 There is a single discrepancy: in
order to ensure that the transaction utility is decreasing in the price, we need the
price function to be su¢ ciently steep, ruling out a scenario where for prices away
from the reference price the distortion diminishes.
Even if unconstrained optimization would lead to the same choice, in the pres-
ence of a budget, di¤erences would arise. Under transaction utility, by denition,
the chosen basket would lead to a spend equal to the available amount, leading to
di¤erent predictions compared to RDP. For example, if all goods resulted in a similar
sticker shock, the outcome (though not the welfare) would be the same as without
the surprise. In my model, the consumer would adjust total spending according to
the sign of the common shock. Similarly, for complementary goods the e¤ects on
cross demand are in opposing directions for the two approaches. As a consequence
of RDP, Corollary 1 of this paper predicts movement in the same direction for the
consumption of both goods, while Thalers model would imply changes in opposing
directions (or, for Leontie¤ preferences, no change at all).
6 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a fresh way of looking at reference price e¤ects in a model
of consumer choice. The idea that it is the prices, not the preferences that are
distorted by the reference price has a number of at rst blush surprising consequences,
which nonetheless can be readily rationalized: witness the concept of a soft budget
constraint. At this stage we do not have the data that could give the proposed model
full empirical validity, so we have to do with the weaker defense that it can explain
some stylized facts. At the same time, to the extent that the role of theory is to train
our intuition, thinking outside the box by moving the reference price out of the utility
function is a worthwhile exercise in its own right.
18Of course, the di¤erent welfare e¤ects would still remain.
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While I have provided several testable predictions, there are lots of implications
of my approach that could not be analyzed here and are left for future research. I
am especially thinking of models of negotiation and dynamic pricing. As an exam-
ple, RDP could be behind the experimental results on bargaining, which are usually
explained by people having a mixture of socialand selsh preferences (c.f. Bolton,
1991). The reference price may be seen as the social focal point. One could analyze
standard bargaining protocols with players su¤eringfrom reference price bias and
explain bargaining data without invoking a conscious fairness motive.
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Part I
Appendix
Here I show that  in the absence of a binding wealth constraint  an outcome
equivalence result holds between the generalized transaction-utility and the RDP
approaches.
Proof. (of Proposition 6) A su¢ cient condition for the result is to establish that
U (w   xp;x) + t  x; p; pR = U  w   xP  p; pR ;x (11)
implies that whenever t satises Assumption 2, P satises Axiom 3 and Assumption
1 and vice versa. Let us begin with the if part. As utility is strictly increasing, we
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can invert it in its rst argument (holding the second constant) and thus we can solve
(11) for P :
P (p; pR) =
w   U 1  U (w   xp) + t  x; p; pR
x
: (12)
As t(0) = 0; it is immediate that P (pR; pR) = pR: Let pR > (<)p; implying that
t
 
x; p; pR

> (<)0:As U(:) is increasing so is U 1(:); so U 1
 
U (w   xp) + t  x; p; pR >
(<)w   xp; hence P (p; pR) < (>)p: Di¤erentiating (12) with respect to p we get
xU 0(w xp) dt=dp
xU 0(U 1(U(w xp)+t(x;p;pR))) > 0; as dt=dp < 0: Since from the previous step, for p < p
R;
U 1
 
U (w   xp) + t  x; p; pR > w xp; the concavity of the utility function implies
that the derivative is indeed above one, not just at p = pR; but for all p < pR:19
Finally, di¤erentiating (12) with respect to pR; we get  dt=dp
R
xU 0(U 1(U(w p)+t(pR p))) ; which
is clearly negative.
Turning to the only if part, from (11)
t
 
x; p; pR

= U
 
w   xP  p; pR ;x  U (w   xp;x) : (13)
It is straightforward that 1-3 of Assumption 2 are satised. Di¤erentiating (13) with
respect to p; we get  xU 0  w   xP  p; pR ;x dP
dp
+ xU 0 (w   xp;x) : In order for this
to be negative we need
dP
dp
>
U 0
 
w   xP  p; pR ;x
U 0 (w   xp;x) ;
exactly as stated in Assumption 3.
Di¤erentiating (13) with respect to pR; we get xU 0  w   xP  p; pR ;x dP
dpR
; which
is clearly positive. Finally, di¤erentiating (13) with respect to x; we get for sim-
plicity, I am assuming that the derivative with respect to the second argument of U
is approximately constant in the relevant range, and hence these terms cancel out 
dt
dx
= pU 0 (w   xp;x)  P  p; pRU 0  w   xP  p; pR ;x : This is positive when
P
 
p; pR

p
<
U 0 (w   xp;x)
U 0 (w   xP (p; pR) ; x) ;
which is satised if and only if p < pR; exactly as needed. Q.E.D.
19That is, the transaction utility approach is not compatible with a price function that has no
distortion at zero, implying that negative perceived prices are necessary for the equivalence to hold.
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